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ABSTRACT
A Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and an Integrated Financial Management 
Information System (IFMIS) are two of the standard reforms promoted and supported by the World 
Bank and other aid agencies in almost every country in Sub-Saharan Africa.  This paper provides a 
balance sheet of the relative success, or otherwise, of these reforms over the last decade.  The aims 
and objectives of the MTEF and the IFMIS are outlined, indicating the initial hopes for these reforms 
and the increasingly strident warnings that this promise was not being delivered.  A case study is 
provided which considers the introduction of MTEF and IFMIS reforms in Rwanda. This 
demonstrates the limited success of these reforms even in a country committed to fundamental 
change and provided with significant resources by the donor community.  The paper then argues 
that it was the economic problems across Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, resulting from external events, which led to a worsening of the quality of financial 
management and governance.  This contrasts with the dominant view that it is poor governance that 
is holding back economic development across the continent.  This leads to considerations of 
effective alternative approaches; the need for real country led reforms which build on the particular 
existing public sector financial management system in each country; and puts a priority on basic 
internal financial controls and reforms which have been clearly proved to be successful in similar 
environments.  An incremental approach, which utilises and enhances local capacity, is considered 
to be far more likely to succeed than big bang approaches like MTEF and IFMIS.
Key Words: MTEF, IFMIS, Sub-Saharan Africa, Debt burden
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We are living through a time of fundamental questioning of received wisdoms and the ideas of what 
represents best practice.  Leading economists across the world are having to rethink their ideas in 
response to the current global economic recession.  In addition, we have seen the election of a US 
president whose main campaign slogan was 'change'.  The previous paradigm of reduced regulation 
and limited state intervention has been replaced by the nationalisation of several leading banks in 
the United States, which most supported neoliberalism and new public management; the US, the UK 
and Iceland.  The need for harder, more detailed regulation of the private sector has gained wide 
spread acceptance (for example, the leader of the WTO in Le Monde, 9 November 2008).  The widely 
held virtue of balanced budgets is being jettisoned in the face of dire economic necessity.  
Governments are borrowing heavily in order to protect their national banking and economic 
systems.  A similarly dramatic re-think is also required in terms of the type of the public sector 
financial management reforms which the international financial institutions and the international aid 
agencies have been promoting across Sub-Saharan Africa for the last decade or so.
Two of the most frequently recommended reforms for governments in the Global South are the 
Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and Integrated Financial Management Information 
Systems (IFMIS).  For example the two core chapters to the World Bank's Public Expenditure 
Management Handbook were devoted to these reforms (World Bank, 1998). Great claims were made 
for the benefits of such reforms, but:
many of the claims made have been based more on theory and what might happen 
after the reforms have worked their way through the system.  These reforms have been 
heavily supported by the international financial institutions and the country aid 
agencies.  However, the actual level of success from their implementation has been 
surprisingly low.  In many cases, where results have not lived up to expectations, this is 
not laid at the door of the “reforms” but rather at the door of the governments who 
have not gone far enough, or have backed off under pressure from 'vested interests'  
(Rosskam, 2006: ix). 
Although MTEFs differ between countries, broadly defined, the MTEF approach allows for the 
linking of policy, planning and budgeting. An MTEF consists of a “top-down resource envelope, a 
bottom-up estimation of the current and medium-term costs of existing policy and, ultimately, the 
matching of these costs with available resources” (World Bank, 1998: 48). As a result, ministries are 
expected to enjoy: greater independence in their resource allocation decisions; increased 
predictability of resource flows; improved accountability and transparency within government; and 
ultimately a more effective and efficient process of resource allocation towards strategic priorities 
within and between sectors.
An IFMIS is a computerized system designed to support public financial management goals and 
priorities. An IFMIS:
usually refers to computerization of public expenditure management processes, 
including budget formulation, budget execution, and accounting, with the help of a 
fully integrated system for financial management of the line ministries and other 
spending agencies (Diamond & Khemani, 2005: 3). 
1
By tracking financial events through an automated financial system, governments are expected to 
be able to better control expenditure and improve transparency and accountability in the budget 
cycle as a whole. However, in practice the World Bank and aid agencies have funded the introduction 
of private sector financial systems, which do not include core budgeting functionalities.  As a result, a 
large part of the real budget management system is operated separately outside the core IFMIS.  
Whilst definitions of the key components of an IFMIS vary, proponents argue that this technology 
provides a set of tools that assist government in undertaking the following tasks: 
• designing appropriate fiscal and monetary responses to changing macro economic 
conditions; 
• ensuring accountability for the deployment and use of public resources; 
• improving the effectiveness and efficiency of public expenditure programs; 
• mobilizing domestic resources and managing external resources (foreign aid and loans); 
• managing civil services; and 
• decentralizing operations with adequate controls. 
Both the MTEF and IFMIS are large, complex and strategic reforms and so are high risk projects which 
have actually suffered high levels of failure.  Thus, for example, World Bank estimates that only 6% of 
the IFMIS they funded were likely to be sustainable (Dorotinsky, 2003).  However, it is the strategic 
nature of these reforms, which can be attractive to those who believe that the public sector in Sub-
Saharan Africa requires fundamental change. They hope that the MTEF and IFMIS reforms will 
support the modernisation of public financial management and the introduction of good 
governance. Their view is supported by the widely accepted idea that poor governance and 
corruption are the main causes of the poor economic growth in Africa (Commission for Africa, 2005; 
Isaksen, 2005).  
However, it may be that this causal relationship actually runs the other way.  Could it be that it is Sub-
Saharan Africa's economic problems which have led to the deterioration in the quality of financial 
management systems? If so, Sub-Saharan African public sector financial managers could be 
considered heroes rather than corrupt bureaucrats. They have attempted to maintain standards in 
the face of severe economic constraints, widespread retrenchment and a significant decline in the 
value of their salaries.  As a result they are the experts in their financial management systems and are 
the people who should lead their government's reform programme to re-build and refine these 
systems.  Local private sector and international consultants may, in certain circumstances be able to 
support local public sector financial staff.  But in many cases the use of such 'experts' and the lack of 
a real lead by the government has led to expensive failures and the waste of resources, which are 
desperately needed to fund the public services, would be necessary to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals.
According to the Danish Institute for International Studies (2008), blue-print approaches and fixed 
ideas about what constitutes a governance agenda can have dangerous consequences, and they 
demonstrate how pragmatic initiatives that do not necessarily reflect widespread ideas about 'good 
governance' can bring about positive results.
A former senior official of the World Bank has also supported the need for a fundamental 
review of the actual progress which has been achieved through the introduction of the MTEF 
or IFMIS reforms, arguing that:
The introduction of the MTEF concept and its early application are now some 15 years 
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old, and the time for a candid and fact-based assessment is long overdue. Given the 
hype the MTEF has enjoyed, its rapid expansion in the last decade, and the disregard of 
some fundamental considerations of institutions and capacity, a little extra emphasis in 
the interest of understanding the actual issues is timely (Schiavo-Campo, 2008).
Despite the calls for country led reforms, the international financial institutions and aid agencies still 
have a dominant role in the direction of public financial management in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
MTEF and IFMIS are still being heavily promoted as the way to improve and to modernise public 
sector financial management across Africa.  In Somalia, for example, a World Bank mission in late 
2007 recommended an IFMIS for the Somali government.  Whilst in Nigeria a large Department for 
International Development (UK) funded project to improve the financial management of state level 
governments, initiated in late 2008, is dominated by the proposal to implement an MTEF in each of 
the states over the next six years.
This study aims to build on a previous Africa Capacity Building Foundation paper (Wynne, 2005), which 
reviewed the MTEF and IFMIS reforms in Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda.  That paper concluded that:
Due to the economic conditions in many developing countries, the World Bank, aid 
agencies and their international consultants wield considerable influence on the 
priorities and approach to public sector financial management. Continued care is 
needed to ensure that their prescriptions are actually relevant and appropriate to the 
needs of each particular country. In particular, given the past record of limited success 
with the implementation of MTEFs, IFMISs and other major reforms, the need for such 
approaches and the evidence of their successful implementation in other countries 
should be rigorously reviewed. The traditional public sector concerns with regularity 
and probity will, if anything, become more important when major reform initiatives are 
being considered. Small-scale investment in basic internal financial controls may often 
bring greater returns than large investment in innovative reforms with their associated 
significant risks of failure. 
MTEFs and IFMISs are considered, at least by the international financial institutions to 
be core public financial management reforms for many developing countries. Their 
level of success, however, has been relatively modest and many of the assumed benefits 
have not necessarily been achieved. As a result, scarce resources and expertise may 
have been wasted on initiatives whose success in practice had not necessarily been 
adequately tested (Wynne, 2005: 32).
After this introduction overviews are provided of the MTEF and the IFMIS indicating the initial hopes 
for these reforms and the increasingly strident warnings that this promise was not being delivered in 
practice across Sub-Saharan Africa.  The next section considers the introduction of MTEF and IFMIS 
reforms in Rwanda.  This demonstrates the limited success of these reforms even in a country 
committed to fundamental change and provided with significant resources by the donor 
community.  The section after that argues that it was the economic problems across Sub-Saharan 
Africa, especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s, resulting from external events, which led to a 
worsening of the quality of financial management and governance. This is in contrast with the 
dominant view that it is poor governance that is holding back economic development across the 
continent. This is followed by a section which considers the need for real country led reform which 
builds on the particular existing public sector financial management system in each country. The final 
section provides the overall conclusions for the study.
3
4II.
The generic objectives of a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) are generally considered 
to be:
• facilitating the achievement of a balanced budget (fiscal discipline)
• enabling the shift of resources to pro-poor areas of the budget in line with agreed poverty 
reduction strategies (Wynne, 2005).
However, there are questions about the extent to which these or other objectives have been 
formally agreed for the country concerned and whether these have been agreed by all the major 
stakeholders. Also such objectives may not have been internally generated to address local concerns 
and priorities, but based on external advice, recommendations or requirements. This is particularly 
the case in the Sub-Saharan African public sector environment where reforms are heavily influenced 
by staff from the international financial institutions and the donor agencies and the actual 
implementation is led by foreign or at least external consultants.  
In addition to the traditional requirement of budget discipline, the following technical and 
institutional factors are considered essential for a successful MTEF:
• a clear framework of national objectives and policies, and sector objectives and strategies
• realistic medium-term resource projections that ensures predictable flows of programmed 
resources to implementing agencies
• a comprehensive budget that captures all the expenditures by the government as well as on 
behalf of the government, for instance by donors and NGOs
• an integrated budget that enables the budget system to relate results and accountabilities 
to resource inputs
• a budget and program classification that can be linked to the national and sectoral 
objectives, that is a functional classification and facilitates the integration of the budget
• financial management institutions to ensure transparency and accountability in the use of 
budget resources
• monitorable indicators of inputs, final and intermediate outputs and outcomes, quantitative 
and qualitative targets of these indicators and a system for regular monitoring of the 
progress toward meeting the targets. The monitoring provides the basis to assess results 
and accountabilities and make adjustments in objectives, targets and budget allocations 
(World Bank, 2005a: 8).
Despite these warnings, the MTEF has become one of the standard public financial management 
reforms which the international financial institutions and the donors have recommended to all 
countries across Sub-Saharan Africa.  
This approach has often not been a success.  The results of nearly fifteen years of this experience 
across the world was recently summarised by a former senior IMF and World Bank official as:
• virtually no evidence of improved macroeconomic balance
• some limited evidence of reallocation to priority sub-sectors
• no evidence of a link to greater budgetary predictability
• no evidence of efficiency gains in spending.
MEDIUM TERM EXPENDITURE FRAMEWORK (MTEF)
5This is what the donors and the developing and middle-income countries have got in 
return for the billions of aid dollars, mountains of red tape, heavy burdens on local 
government staff, and literally centuries of full-time-equivalent technical experts 
(Schiavo-Campo, 2008: 6).
And:
there is mounting skepticism of all MTEF concepts—seen as exhausting and expensive 
initiatives pushed by donors, and carried out as supply-driven self-propelled exercises 
conducted mainly by external consultants (Schiavo-Campo, 2008: 7).
Additionally, in Africa, the financial plans developed from the MTEFs have been criticised as:
plans in Africa have widely been considered shopping lists - used to extract funding 
from donors but without any effect on other public expenditure whatsoever (Isaksen, 
2005).
Finally, Schick, a frequent presenter at World Bank public financial management events, has also 
commented that:
Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs) have not proven a panacea to the 
challenges of budget planning, preparation and management in most countries. A 
possible epitaph for MTEF-type reforms would read “Died of many causes, each of 
which was sufficient (Schick, 2008).
Warnings of failure
These results did not come without prior warning.  A former IMF and World Bank official recently 
admitted that with the MTEF:
A first glimmer of recognition of these problems [with the MTEF] appeared at the 
World Bank's “PREM Week” meeting of late 2000, when it was noted, among other 
things, that if a country cannot put together a sensible annual budget and execute it in 
minimally acceptable fashion it is very unlikely to have any use for a medium-term 
expenditure framework. One panellist (Alister Moon) gave a long list of preconditions 
for introducing an MTEF, including macroeconomic stability; revenue predictability; 
early political commitment; core capacity of the finance ministry and central agencies; 
supportive donor behaviour; capacity to enforce a hard budget constraint at the 
ministry level; executive commitment to having a transparent budget process; and 
capacity in sector policy analysis (Schiavo-Campo, 2008: 5).
Two years after these warnings of potential failure, in a major study for the World Bank, Le Houerou 
and Taliercio (2002) came to the following conclusions of the progress with the MTEF across Africa:
The limited quantitative evidence shows, thus far, that MTEFs are not yet 
unambiguously associated with their objectives… In terms of macroeconomic balance, 
with the possible exception of Uganda, there is no evidence that MTEFs have made a 
6significant impact. In terms of resource allocation, there is some limited and qualified 
evidence to suggest that MTEFs are linked to reallocations to a subset of priority 
sectors. With respect to budgetary predictability and consistency, there is no support 
for the assumption that MTEFs are associated with greater discipline and less deviation. 
At best, then, these cases present a mixed picture (Le Houerou and Taliercio, 2002: 24).
These conclusions were being repeated in March 2008 at a major World Bank seminar as being the 
current picture.  The seminar was organised to re-assess the World Bank's public financial work 
including a review of its experience with the MTEF (World Bank, 2008a). One of the presenters at the 
event asked “Have certain donor-led PFM initiatives complicated the PFM reform landscape in 
countries, e.g. MTEF?” and a World Bank senior staff member said that MTEFs had become a 
reputational risk to the Bank.  It is hoped that these concerns will lead to greater changes in practice 
and advice to governments than has been achieved in the past.  
At another seminar held later in 2008, this time organised by the IMF, the same presenter 
noted that: 
Recent World Bank studies… revealed significant shortcomings in the way that MTEFs 
had been designed and implemented in many developing countries. The IFIs and 
development institutions themselves bear some responsibility for the mixed success in 
implementing MTEFs and for generating unrealistic expectations about what MTEFs 
could and would achieve in practice (Brumby, 2008). 
At the same event, yet another official commented that:
The realization of the magnitude of wasted resources and dashed expectations is 
sobering (Schiavo-Campo, 2008b). 
The World Bank should therefore put more effort into listening to local public sector financial 
officials, building on their expertise and understanding of the local environment to ensure that local 
public sector financial management reform programmes are more successful in future.  Public 
sector financial managers should have confidence and pride in the way that they have managed their 
systems, especially over the very difficult times of the last few decades. They need to be able to 
consider carefully the evidence on the extent to which reforms recommended by international 
consultants are actually being effective in similar environments to their own.  Where necessary, they 
have the responsibility to reject the advice of the international financial institutions and the 
consultants they appoint, especially where they do not provide adequate evidence that the reforms 
are actually working effectively in other countries. The World Bank should ensure that developing 
countries are not unduly penalised for not accepting the recommended reforms.
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(IFMIS)
Another mega-reform, which has been heavily promoted across Sub-Saharan African public sectors, 
is the concept of an Integrated Financial Management System (IFMIS).  This involves introducing a 
single IT financial system for the whole of government covering at least all central government 
ministries and departments.  Thus each ministry should be able to input and access its financial data 
and information on a single financial system and the Ministry of Finance should be able to monitor 
the finances, payments and receipts of each ministry on a daily basis.  The IFMIS should, in the most 
developed models, also include regional and local government institutions (as was planned for 
Pakistan).  However, such systems also suffer from a high risk of failure.  This is true for all IT projects 
even in industrial countries, but is even higher where:
• the project is more complex
• capacity of local officials to critically assess all aspects of the project is limited
• the project is led or heavily influenced by external or foreign consultants
• informed political support and the willingness to provide appropriate resources is not 
available.
The aim of an IFMIS is to integrate all aspects of the government's budgetary cycle and provide 
suitable interfaces to other systems and entities.  Thus an IFMIS may be based on the following 
generic model:
Figure 1:  Overview of IFMIS component interfaces
INTEGRATED FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM 
CORE FINAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM - 
BUDGET EXECUTION AND ACCOUNTING
Budget execution - procedures for making 
commitments and releasing funds
Payments and receipts - processes for making 
payments and receiving revenues and other 
inflows
Accounting - recording transactions in the 
general ledger in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles
Cash and fund management - ensuring 
transactions are managed against cash and 
fund constraints
Reporting and management information - 
provision of information in form of reports and 
otherwise to managers and other stakeholder
Financial statements - provision of annual 
other financial statements in prescribed 
formats to comply without the law and 
accounting standards
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An integrated treasury system offers several significant benefits in managing public monies more 
effectively. These include: a) Full integration of budget and budget execution data, thereby allowing 
greater financial control; b) Improved planning for cash as well as close and timely monitoring of the 
government's cash position; c) Provision of adequate management reporting at various levels of 
budget execution; d) Improvement of data quality for the preparation and execution of the budget; 
and e) Facilitation of the preparation of financial statements and other financial reports for 
budgeting, analysis and financial control (Hashim and Allan, 2001).
As with the MTEF, the implementation of an IFMIS was often on the initiative of World Bank staff and 
supported by the necessary finance, although, computerisation has usually been enthusiastically 
embraced by public sector managers who are keen to modernise their government's financial 
management systems. In this situation, external advisors and consultants have a strong 
responsibility to ensure that appropriate technology is implemented by an intelligent and well-
informed client.
This task is made more difficult as advisors will inevitably emphasise successful projects and the level 
of potential risk is underestimated as:
The literature on IFMISs in Africa has tended to extol the success of one or more country 
experiences. Such assessments are incomplete because the experience with these 
systems on the continent has not been adequately documented  (Peterson, 2007: 5).
To reduce the risks involved in developing an IFMIS, it may be preferable for the system to be 
implemented in stages with, for example, the implementation of a computerised payments and 
budget monitoring system in the Ministry of Finance as a first stage, the extension to line ministries 
as the second and, only after the system has proved to be working effectively, its use by regional 
and/or local government should be considered.  In addition:
Both the Ethiopian and Tanzania experience with automating financial systems 
demonstrate the value of a modular approach and the need to selectively not 
comprehensively address core deficiencies of financial control - fixing the hole(s) in the 
whole. They both involved extensive customization to meet user requirements. They 
both put into question the need for 'high end' commercial off-the-shelf systems which 
are expensive, complex, difficult to customize and have features which have little or no 
use for the current or foreseeable needs of a government (Peterson, 2007: 40).
Other preconditions for developing an IFMIS include the following:
• Authorities' commitment and ownership is clear
- Clear institutional designation
- Clear authority to implement
- Active involvement, with no undue delegation to suppliers
• Preconditions are ready for reform
-  Authorities prepared to reengineer work practices
-  Environment encourages reform
9-  Sufficient skills and/or training available
-  Users are “sold” on the system
- Steering group is active and representative
• Project design is sound
- Adequate time taken on design phase
- Users fully involved in specification
- Not too ambitious in scope
- Timetable is realistic
• Management of project is capable
- Adequate management skills
- Managers motivated to reform
- Full-time implementation team identified
- In-house or outsourced maintenance capacity identified, in place, and properly  costed
• Adequate resources are assured
- Sufficient funds since actual costs might exceed anticipated cost
- Resource demands caused by operating two parallel systems simultaneously
- Sufficient resources for long-term operation and maintenance of the system 
(Diamond and Khemani, 2005).
Great expectations to expensive failure
stIn the emerging knowledge-based economy of the 21  century, information and communications 
technology will likely assume an importance that dwarfs other types of infrastructure. This shift 
offers Africa a chance to leapfrog intermediate stages of development by avoiding costly 
investments in time, resources, and the generation and use of knowledge. Africa has a chance to 
benefit not only as a consumer in the new knowledge economy, but also as a producer. It cannot 
afford to miss this opportunity  (World Bank, 2000: 153). According to Heeks (2006), e-government is 
difficult to implement, hard to manage and often fails (Heeks, 2006: 10). Similarly, survey and poll 
results produce the following working estimates about e-government initiatives in 
developing/transitional countries: a) 35% are total failures; b) 50% are partial failures; and, c)15% are 
successes (eGov for Development, 2007).
The aforementioned indicate the huge gulf between the hype and the reality of IT reforms.  IFMIS in 
particular, and IT in general, have been promoted as providing the key answers to improving the 
quality and efficiency of a modern public sector.  However, the reality has been a series of failed 
projects and, in many cases, the wastage of millions of dollars, which are desperately needed for 
investment in many other areas of the public sector.
In Ghana an IFMIS was launched in 1997 by the then Vice President, John Atta Mills.  He argued that 
the IFMIS would:
not only facilitate budget execution, accounting and financial reporting but will also 
place responsibility on the Ministers to monitor and account for resource use […] the 
policies we formulate, the programmes we implement, the resources we use, must all 
be accounted for in terms of the extent to which they help us improve our living 
standards (PUFMARP newsletter, September 1997: 4-5; quoted in Fyson, 2009).
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However, by May 2006 the Deputy Controller and Accountant General of Ghana noted that, "there 
has as yet not been one Cedi [local currency] benefit from it. I have not used [the IFMIS] to generate 
one report yet" (Fyson, 2009).
This experience has also been replicated in industrial countries.  According to Gauld, Goldfinch & 
Dale (2006), reviews of a number of IT case studies in Australia, Britain, New Zealand and United 
States, IT is a dangerous enthusiasm. In contrast they argue that pessimism, or at least the 
expectation of failure, should be the guiding principle. 
The conclusions appear to be even more relevant and important in Africa, where the experience has, 
if anything, been worse in terms of the risk of IT failure, as the following quotations demonstrate:
the evidence does all point in one direction: towards high rates of e-government 
project failure in Africa (Heeks, 2002: 11)
information systems fail or under perform more often than they succeed in the public 
sector in Africa (Peterson, 1998: 38)
the success rate of introduced information technology systems in African state 
agencies has been distressingly low (Berman and Tettey, 2001: 2). 
One of the reasons for this high failure rate is that the economics of IT investment in Africa is different 
from that in industrial countries.  In Africa, labour is relatively cheap, IT hardware and skills are not 
available locally and transport costs make IT more expensive to purchase and to maintain. Average 
public sector wage costs in Africa can be one-tenth or less than those in industrial countries.  Average 
IT costs, in contrast, may be two to three times higher.  E-Governance and automation using modern 
IT technology therefore can result in replacing cheap civil servants with costly IT (Heeks, 2002). 
In late 2003, Dorotinsky provided a useful overview of the World Bank's experience of providing over 
$1billion to finance IFMIS projects over the previous 17 years. The average time for completion of 
each project was over nine years for African projects and the average cost of each of the 34 projects 
worldwide was $12.3 million (Dorotinsky, 2003). If success is defined on the basis of being on budget, 
on time and delivered as planned, then only 21% of these projects were successful. An even gloomier 
view was provided by assessments of the same projects by the World Bank staff.  Dorotinsky (2003) 
writes again that a quarter of the projects were considered unsustainable, 69% likely to be 
sustainable and only 6% considered highly likely to be sustainable. This figure was even lower for 
Africa than other regions.
Dorotinsky stated that the general lesson from the World Bank's experience was the requirement to 
have clear political commitment and ownership by the borrowing country. He also pointed out that 
such schemes were generally less successful in poorer countries and highlighted the following 
additional risks: a) lack of capacity; b) lack of government commitment; c) too many project 
components; and, d) opposition by staff and line ministries (Dorotinsky, 2003).
In 2005 the IMF published a working paper which investigated the reason for the serious delays and 
frequent failure to implement and sustain IFMIS reforms in the Global South (Diamond & Khemani, 
2005).  This working paper concludes that an IFMIS should be implemented as part of a wider set of 
public financial management reforms. The IFMIS will require clear government commitment, 
support and significant resources.  It should also be phased over a number of years when current and 
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interim arrangements will still be required.  Even if these recommendations are implemented, the 
two authors mention that a government implementing an IFMIS can expect:
a long implementation path, and one that involves significant challenges. It will be a 
complex learning process for all concerned. A number of difficulties are likely to be 
encountered en route (Diamond & Khemani, 2005: 27).  
Consultants and expertise
Private sector consultants have increasingly been called upon to assist aid-dependent countries to 
strengthen their public sector governance systems (Fyson, 2009).  Almost invariably IFMIS projects 
will be unique in the country concerned, at least in the public sector.  Thus the use of consultants will 
usually be considered essential.  The appointment, management and monitoring of the work of the 
consultants should be adequately controlled and the extent to which their work contributes to the 
success of each reform is crucial. 
However, many of the consultant firms are major companies and so the relationship between the 
client government and the consultant is not a relationship between equals. The budgets of 
consultancy firms often outstrip those of the countries in which they work. Price Waterhouse 
Coopers for example, recorded a total net revenue of US$14.7 billion for financial year 2003 – a figure 
that far outstrips the GDP of any country in Sub-Saharan Africa with the exception of Nigeria and 
South Africa (Hilary, 2004: 7, quoted in Fyson, 2009).  In addition, the international consultancy firms 
have access to more information about actual successes and challenges which other governments 
have experienced with their IFMIS reforms (they may also have relationships with suppliers of IT 
equipment or software).
Some of the literature focuses on the work of contractors as a necessary contribution to the 
development effort bringing both resources and expertise to assist in building local capacity… In 
contrast, at the other end of the spectrum, scholars have argued that the work of the consultants 
funded by development agencies, will necessarily have a nefarious impact on the longer-term 
prospects for development (Berg, 1993; Easterly, 2002; Hilary, 2004). After all, as Wedel (1998) 
argues, how can private sector consultants earning many times their counterparts' salary assist the 
public sectors of low-income and aid-dependent countries (as exemplified in Eastern Europe by the 
so-called 'Marriott Brigades'? Instead, expatriate consultants and advisors are perceived as a 
“systematic destructive force which is undermining the development of capacity in Africa” (Jaycox, 
1993 quoted in Fyson, 2009: 320). 
In the UK, where private sector consultants are also used extensively to advise public sector officials, 
the NAO (2006b) identified the following recommendations on achieving value for money in the use 
of consultants:
1. Public bodies need to be much better at identifying where core skill gaps exist in relation to 
medium and long-term programme requirements. This knowledge should be used to plan for 
recruitment, training, and using consultants. Recruitment of full-time personnel and training of 
existing personnel can provide better value for money than continued use of consultants. 
2. Public bodies should start with the presumption that their own staff are best fitted for their 
requirements. While it will often be the case that they need to purchase specific expertise from 
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consulting firms, more generalist requirements can be met more cost-effectively by internal 
resources. 
3. Public bodies should adhere to agreed regulations on the recommended threshold levels 
requiring Ministerial or Permanent Secretary approval of consultancy contracts. Approvals 
should be based on a robust business case. Adhering to the guidance will ensure that senior 
management has full sight of the larger consulting contracts, promoting better accountability 
for this spend.
4. Public bodies need to engage with the market earlier to explore a range of possible 
approaches and contracting methods. Early contact with suppliers during the procurement 
process improves both the supplier and client's understanding of the requirement. Public 
bodies would get more tailored and innovative responses to their invitations to tender. 
5. Public bodies should make more use of different payment mechanisms such as fixed price and 
incentivised contracts instead of the standard time and materials. Different payment 
mechanisms can help control costs and formalise the joint objectives between clients and 
consultants. The different payment options require a strong understanding of the project's 
objectives, scope, risks, and approach. 
6. Public bodies must be smarter when it comes to understanding how consulting firms operate 
and in sharing information about their performance. Public bodies should have regular, senior-
level discussions with their consultants to openly discuss medium to long-term objectives and 
plans. Public bodies should also use their understanding of suppliers' objectives to maximise 
their purchasing advantage. Public bodies need to have a clear understanding of who their key 
suppliers are, how they are organised, their incentive mechanisms (which might focus on selling 
further work), and commercial practices. 
7. Public bodies need to provide sufficient incentive to staff to make the consultancy project a 
success. Recent research has shown that the further removed someone is from the decision to 
use consultants the more likely they are to feel confused about project responsibilities and 
accountabilities, frustrated because they don't know what the consultants are doing, complain 
of poor communication and be cynical about the consultants involvement. 
The need to employ consultants to assist with an IFMIS project will generally increase the financial 
and other risks associated with the project.  Great care is needed to ensure that the consultants 
provide good value for money and that they do not lead to the further demoralisation and capacity 
reduction of the government's own staff.  External consultants should only be used when this 
approach is essential, the particular skills they bring are not needed over the medium term and they 
are not available from within the organisation.  
Skill transfer to public sector officials is an essential element of all IT projects.  This skill transfer and 
the retention of the necessary skills must be a key and explicit part of all IFMIS projects and should be 
effectively monitored and managed to ensure that the projects are sustainable and the IT managers 
have the skills and experience to manage the project effectively.  The capacity to manage an IFMIS 
has to be internalised as soon as possible to ensure that the project is successful.
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IV. RWANDA – HOME GROWN REFORMS
Introduction
Following the end of the genocide in 1994, Rwanda embarked on a reconstruction of its economy 
and initiated significant public sector financial management reforms designed to improve national 
governance.  Following the adoption of a new constitution in 2003, legislative and presidential 
elections were held resulting in the election of the present government of President Paul Kagame.
The reconstruction efforts were associated with significant growth both in the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and GDP per capita.  However, by 2006 to the per capita GDP was still only US$281.  
Economic growth was also associated with significant improvements in Government revenue 
collection, planning and budgetary reform and improvements in its financial management and 
accountability systems.  
The ongoing improvements in the political and economic environment of the country made it 
possible to introduce more systematic planning and budgetary control measures.  Consequently, a 
decision was made to introduce the MTEF in 2000 and financial management and accountability 
systems through the IFMIS, which was to be effective between 2000 and 2003.
The first section of this section provides the political and economic background to Rwanda prior to 
the introduction of the reforms.  Section 2 examines some of the factors that influenced the decision 
to introduce the MTEF. Both the Government of Rwanda and external donors influenced the 
introduction of these reforms. The process and calendar for the introduction of the MTEF over the 
years 2001 to 2003 are discussed, including the need to train and sensitize all those involved in the 
introduction of the reforms. The objectives of the MTEF, as identified by the Rwandese Government 
provide, a basis for the evaluation of this reform. A Design and Implementation Group was 
established which prepared a plan of action used to guide the introduction and implementation of 
the reforms.  
Rwanda's experiences with the MTEF are evaluated in section 3.  Significant progress has been made 
in strengthening both the planning and budgetary aspects of the MTEF. As a result, all ministries now 
follow the MTEF process in their submissions to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.  
However, more efforts are required to improve both the quality of economic data collection and 
budgetary integration structures.  In addition, very little local capacity was built as a result of the 
introduction of these reforms.  This was due to the high level of dependency on donors, the use of 
consultants and the high staff turnover within Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance.
Section 4 examines Rwanda's efforts to introduce an IFMIS which was aimed at complimenting the 
MTEF.  The system, named Smartgov, was developed specifically for Rwanda. Smartgov is limited 
and only provides data for the Government's periodic budget execution reports.  Consequently, it 
cannot be fairly described as a comprehensive IFMIS. Smartgov failed to provide an adequate source 
of data for the preparation of the Government's annual financial statements for the fiscal year 
ending 31 December 2006, the first financial statements produced since 1994. As a result, the 
Government obtained a separate accounting package which was partly used for the development of 
these financial statements, although a large part of the processes was done outside the system.
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Section 5 concludes on the Rwandan reforms and notes the leadership role assumed by Ministry of 
Economic Planning and Finance in providing guidance in strategic planning, budgetary and policy 
review as well as budget execution.  However, further enhancements are needed especially in the 
areas of budgetary integration, financial control and accountability. The Government's capacity 
building needs for the MTEF and IFMIS reforms also call for sustained and systematic attention.
The political and economic environments prior to the adoption and implementation of MTEF & 
IFMIS
Situated in Central Africa, east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda gained 
independence from Belgium in 1962. In 1959, the majority Hutus overthrew the ruling Tutsi king.  
Subsequent political upheavals exacerbated ethnic tensions ultimately leading to the April 1994 
genocide of approximately 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus.
Since 1994, there has been considerable improvement in political governance; for example, national 
elections were held in 2003 following the adoption of a new constitution.  Both the parliamentary 
and presidential elections were won by the Rwanda Patriotic Front led by Paul Kagame, the country's 
current President with a term of office lasting until 2010. 
In terms of economic development and poverty reduction, the country has made relatively good 
progress since the genocide.  Between 1994 and 2004, economic growth averaged 10% per annum 
and was expected to be 6.2% during 2006 (MINECOFIN, 2006).  Growth in GDP per capita, averaging 
5.3% per annum over this period, was the third highest in Africa. In recent years per capita GDP has 
been as follows:
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Estimate Projection
US$ US$ US$ US$ US$
266 251 271 281 292
Source: MINECOFIN (2006)
Poverty levels, although significant, declined from 70% in 1994 to less than 60% in 2002 
(dfid.gov.uk/countries/Africa/Rwanda.asp).  An initial Poverty Reduction Strategy was introduced in 
2000 and finalised in 2002.  A more comprehensive strategy EDPRS (Economic Development and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy) was finalised in 2007 and launched across the country. It was written 
jointly by Government of Rwanda staff teams and consultants including the public financial 
management advisor. Good governance is regarded as pivotal for the Government's poverty 
reduction efforts.  
During a substantial part of the post-genocide period, Rwanda received the necessary technical 
assistance for macroeconomic analysis and planning required for budget management from both 
bilateral and multilateral organizations (the African Development Bank, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development 
(DFID).  Of these donors, DFID has been the country's major bilateral partner providing £200 million 
worth of development assistance over the last ten years.
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Improvements were also made in revenue collection following the establishment of the Rwanda 
Revenue Authority in 1998.  Revenues, although still modest, increased from approximately 10.6% of 
GDP in 1996 to 12.2% in 2002 (Chukwuma, 2005).
There were also substantial improvements made in the areas of budget reform, monitoring and 
reporting; for example, since 1999, budget transactions have been computerized and a system of 
monthly reports on budget outturns introduced. Budget preparation was also decentralized 
thereby enabling line ministries to participate in the preparation of their budgets subject to the 
ceilings imposed by cabinet. In addition, institutions designed to build capacity for financial 
accountability were established.  Among these were the following:
• Office of the Auditor-General
• Office of the Accountant General
• National Tender Board
• Inspector-General for Public Finances (to audit budget transactions)
• Division of Government Accounts (to prepare and publish regular financial statements 
covering government operations).
Given these improvements in the political and economic environments of the country, it became 
possible to introduce more systematic macroeconomic planning and budgetary control measures.  
For this purpose, a decision was made to introduce a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 
in 2000.
Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF)
Timetable for the MTEF Introduction
The period after 1994 was characterized by a desire to improve national governance, national 
reconciliation, political transition and economic management.  The introduction of an MTEF in 
Rwanda was therefore seen as complimenting these wider reforms with particular reference to:
• economic planning and management
• budgetary preparation and execution
• public expenditure accountability and financial management.
The MTEF reforms were introduced as an initiative of both the Government of Rwanda and donor 
organizations, especially the IMF and Department for International Development (UK). In particular, 
responses from our questionnaire indicated that there was significant donor influence in the 
following areas:
• overall design and performance
• assessing training needs
• introduction and implementation.
Officials in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning suggested that the significant 
involvement of foreign consultants had an adverse effect on capacity building during the 
implementation of the MTEF.  For example, at the time of our field visit, there was only one source of 
institutional memory connected with the introduction of the MTEF. This was the current Director of 
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1.Personal communication with former public financial management advisor.
the Information Technology Unit of Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. All other officials 
directly involved with the introduction of this reform had left the Ministry for other posts. This had 
made worse the loss of institutional memory from foreign consultants leaving at the end of the 
project. Prior to its introduction, an MTEF Design and Implementation Group was established to 
formulate a plan of action.  This group resolved to introduce the reforms in three phases as follows:
• Phase 1 (2001): The focus here was on ensuring that all personnel involved in the reforms 
would receive adequate training on the concept of programs and how these were to be 
designed for various government ministries and agencies.
• Phase 2 (2002): The training sessions during this phase covered the concept of sub-programs 
and how to design them.
• Phase 3 (2003): Trainees here were exposed to ways of identifying the outputs and activities 
for their respective centres and also how to determine the inputs required to achieve the 
required outputs.
The training sessions were intended to assist senior staff of line ministries, including secretary-
generals (referred to as permanent secretaries in other countries) and directors to learn and apply 
the new MTEF tools in preparing budgets in the MTEF framework. The Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning also report that similar training sessions and workshops were carried out for 
local government officers following the decentralization of government in 2000 (see concerns 
about extending the MTEF concept to lower tiers of government later in this report). Workshops 
were conducted in May/June and August/September 2001. These were attended by over 300 
directors and heads of divisions from the12 provinces and district council members responsible for 
economic affairs or planning.
Discussions with officials from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and the Ministry of 
Local Government suggest that most participants benefited from the workshops and training 
sessions, particularly in terms of their understanding of the MTEF process and how the Strategic 
Planning Model should be used for economic management. In 2007 the Ministry of Finance and 
1Economic Planning resuscitated the MTEF project, which was fully launched in 2008 . 
Objectives of the MTEF
On its introduction in 2000, the objectives of the MTEF were to:
1. Create a predictable and consistent national policy and budget framework, within which line 
ministries are assured of the budgetary resources which will be made available to them over a 
three-year period and fully informed of the policy goals to be achieved with these resources;
2. Restructure sectoral and ministerial budgets to reflect the objectives in programs and sub-
programs;
3. Introduce an output focus into budget preparation and execution, such that budgets are always 
reviewed and monitored with respect to outputs and outcomes;
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4. Foster development of budget estimates based on objectives and policies, costed at the level of 
outputs and activities;
5. Improve financial management and accountability so that budget execution is consistent with 
budgetary appropriations;
6. Develop a comprehensive, integrated budget that would capture all public expenditures in an 
integrated format with development and recurrent budgets considered together;  and
7. Close the gap between sector policies and budgets so that all expenditures are consistent with 
policies and all policies consistent with resource constraints.
Rwanda introduced the MTEF in all ministries as well as local governments.  A phased approach for 
the implementation of the various elements was adopted, and for this purpose, a plan of action was 
drawn-up covering the three years 2000 to 2002.  For each year themes were identified, as follows:
 
• Ministerial Missions, Objectives and Outcomes - 2000
• Cost Analysis for Efficiency and Effectiveness - 2001
• Integrated Budgeting - 2002.
The plan of action emphasized the importance of training and sensitizing all personnel that would be 
involved in the three themes of the reform process.  Clearly, these three technical phases are 
important elements in any effort to analyze the success or otherwise, of MTEF reforms in Rwanda.
Assessment of Rwanda's MTEF Reforms
The impact of the MTEF in Rwanda was assessed on the basis of the extent to which the objectives of 
each of the three technical themes were achieved. A field visit was made to Rwanda in March 2007.  
During that visit, meetings and interviews were carried out with several government officials and 
other stakeholders and relevant documents were collected. A questionnaire covering the MTEF was 
prepared and sent out to select key informants to obtain background information before the field 
study. The questionnaire was also used as an aide memoir during interviews undertaken as part of 
the field study.
Technical Phase 1: Ministerial Missions, Objectives and Outputs (2000)
As the MTEF was introduced, the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy was also initiated and 
completed in 2002.  This provided a useful basis on which to develop national policies and objectives 
which would eventually assist national and sector budgeting processes. As a result, each ministry 
was required to set out its programs, activities, inputs and outputs within the context of its own 
mission statement and objectives.  This was also to be applicable to local government and other 
lower structures thereby ensuring the adoption of MTEF at these levels.  For this purpose, a Strategic 
Planning Model was prepared in 2001 which was divided into eight levels (World Bank, 2003) as 
follows:
• Mission Statement –the purpose of the organization, whom it serves, the services it provides 
and the values it observes;
• Environmental Scan- an examination of the environment in which it operates, looking at its 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats;
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•
mission in the environment in which it operates;
• Programs- a collection of activities aimed at achieving an objective;
• Sub-programs- a manageable and meaningful group of activities necessary to produce one 
or  more outputs, within a program;
• Outputs- the goods and services to be produced/provided to achieve each of the objectives;
• Activities –what will be done to produce an output; and
• Inputs- the specific requirements to undertake an activity.
The Strategic Planning Model is useful, not only because it was used as a basis for the training of 
government officials on the MTEF, but also because it provided guidance on the content and format 
necessary for the presentation of MTEF based budgets.
Technical Phase 2: Cost Analysis (2001)
Although this second phase of the plan of action was delayed due to implementation problems, it 
was subsequently included in some training sessions in 2002. However, knowledge gained in the 
techniques of costing priority programs during the preparation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Program would also have been useful in cost analyses for the MTEF.
Technical Phase 3: Integrated Budgeting (2002)
This was the third and final stage in the plan of action.  It appears that some progress was made and 
budget classification improved following the introduction of a functional classification. Key 
functions used are: 
• Governance & Sovereignty (defence, public order & security); 
• Infrastructure (fuel & energy, transport & communication); 
• Production and Development (environmental protection, agriculture, industry & 
commerce); and 
• Human Development (youth, culture & sport, health, education).  
As a result, it is now possible to adopt a program approach because recurrent and capital budget 
activities can be grouped by meaningful programs and sub-programs.   
Conclusions
On the whole, it would appear that Rwanda successfully used its macroeconomic reforms 
introduced between 1994 and 1999 to launch an MTEF from 2000.  In addition to the improvements 
referred to above in the area of budget reforms, the merger of the ministries of finance and planning 
in 1997 led to better budget integration.   
Declaring its intention to integrate the recurrent and development budgets by 1999, the unified 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, also made efforts to streamline and strengthen the 
procedures of preparing its Public Investment Program (PIP) and development budget. The 
objective with respect to the former was to ensure that projects in the PIP better reflected 
Government policies.  A major result of the budget preparation and integration efforts is that the 
Government's development and recurrent budgets are now presented to the legislature as a single 
document, in contrast to past practices.
Objectives- what the organization intends to achieve over a period of time to fulfill its 
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Notwithstanding the above achievements, there is still room for improvements in key areas such as 
data collection especially that relating to donor support; co-ordination procedures both between 
the Government and donors on the one hand, and within government departments themselves on 
the other.  Improvements are also needed in procedures relating to budget integration. 
These improvements are still necessary despite the establishment of the Central Projects and 
External Finance Bureau whose key responsibilities are to monitor and evaluate development 
projects being implemented, coordinate donor funding of specific projects and also manage the 
Public Investment Program. The main cause of the problems being experienced in budget 
integration is the failure to integrate the budgeting and planning functions of the new Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning and those of line ministries.
Capacity Building Impact of MTEF in Rwanda
Local capacity built as a result of the introduction of the MTEF in Rwanda, appears to have been 
insignificant.  Indeed, no one else, other than the Director of the Information Technology Unit in 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, appears to be knowledgeable about the process of 
introducing the MTEF.  Discussions with officials in that Ministry suggest two reasons for this: the 
role of consultants in the design and implementation of the reforms and the loss of staff originally 
trained in the reforms.   
In addition, the report of the Auditor General covering the period November 2005 to October 2006, 
confirms the adverse consequences of this apparent over-dependence on consultants. In part, the 
report concludes as follows with respect to what it described as 'non-performing consultants': 
I noted that some entities audited have hired consultants to bridge the skills gap in the 
financial management function.  However, it has been noted that in most cases there is 
no value for money spent because they fail to deliver the expected results.  There is no 
supervision of their work by management and there is usually no local staff to 
understudy the consultants' work thus no transfer of skills.  This instead widens the 
existing capacity gap. 
These developments appear to have also adversely affected capacity building efforts directed at 
improving the country's financial controls and accountability systems.  This is also discussed in the 
next section in connection with the introduction of an IFMIS. Accordingly, the major benefits of the 
introduction appear to have been limited to the introduction of a functional classification for the 
budget, some programme budgeting and some integration of the development and recurrent 
budgets.
Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS)
The World Bank states that information is the life blood of budgetary, resource allocation and 
financial management (World Bank, 1998: 59). According to the World Bank Public Expenditure 
Handbook (1998), a well structured financial management system should lead to the following 
benefits:
• the ability to control aggregate spending and a country's deficit
• ensuring accountability for the deployment and use of public funds
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•
for allocative efficiency and equity
• better use of budgeted resources, i.e., to achieve outcomes and produce outputs at the 
lowest possible cost.
Factors influencing the introduction of IFMIS
The introduction of an IFMIS in Rwanda (commonly referred to as Smartgov) appears to have been a 
logical extension of the MTEF reforms.  In particular, the key objectives were to: a) upgrade the 
existing systems; and b) design budget and accounting systems compatible with the MTEF.
Thus, Smartgov was expected to facilitate the following:
• budget classifications {Economic, Hierarchical and Sector/Functional}
• budget preparation
• Budget execution
• prepayments
• payment orders and
• financial reporting.
 IFMIS process and organization framework
Smartgov was developed specifically for the Rwandan Government by six foreign consultants and 12 
local engineers. Its budget was approximately US$1 million, which was all financed by the 
Government of Rwanda. Its development immediately followed the introduction of the MTEF in 
2003 and it was expected to be fully operational by December 2006. The process involved the 
establishment of three teams each of which was responsible for the development of appropriate 
systems to cater for the following: a) Tax system; b) Accounting system; and c) Budgetary system.
Within the parameters of the objectives of Smartgov, the team responsible for the tax system was 
expected to develop appropriate systems to enable the accurate and orderly collection of national 
revenues of all types (direct and indirect taxation); that responsible for the accounting system was 
expected to develop appropriate financial management and control systems to facilitate the proper 
utilization of public funds; whilst the third team was to ensure that appropriate systems compatible 
with the MTEF budgetary process were developed.
 
Assessment of Rwanda's IFMIS reforms
As with the MTEF reforms, the success of the IFMIS implementation was assessed based on the 
extent to which the agreed objectives were achieved. Discussions with Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning officials suggest that there was little or no coordination of the work of the three 
teams of consultants involved in the development of Smartgov.  Indeed, as the software was being 
developed, another team developed the accounting chart of accounts and manuals and the first 
team developed a separate system for the Rwanda Revenue Authority. As a result, neither the 
accounting chart of accounts nor the manuals were compatible with the electronic tools prepared 
for Smartgov. In addition, the system developed for the Rwanda Revenue Authority was also 
incompatible with Smartgov.  
Overall, Smartgov turned out to be a single entry system with no detailed transaction information 
relating to the extent to which the budgetary allocations from Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning were used in a manner consistent with the recipient ministry's programs and sub-
enabling the strategic prioritization of expenditure across policies, programs and projects 
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programs. Consequently, it could be argued that the system failed to achieve the original objectives 
as stated above. However, Smartgov is useful for compiling the periodic budgetary execution 
reports, which are in turn used by the Auditor General as a basis for her reports to parliament.
Smartgov thus, generally proved to be unsuitable as a reliable source of the data for the preparation 
of the Government's annual financial statements, a major area of financial management and 
accountability. Consequently, The Government decided that all years prior to 2006 would be ignored 
and that the first financial statements to be produced since the reforms were started would be for 
the fiscal year 2006.  For this purpose, consultants from Price Waterhouse Coopers were engaged in 
December 2006 and given the responsibility to produce the 2006 accounts by March 2007.  
At the time of our field-visit (early March 2007), the consultants had requested, and had been 
granted, an extension of this target by one month.  To assist the consultants, the Government 
authorized the purchase and installation of Sage-Pastel, an accounting system imported from South 
Africa, specifically for the purpose of data capture for the consolidated financial statements.  
Although Sage-Pastel has been installed in all ministries and local governments, it will only work if a 
maximum of twenty users are on-line and so it has been installed as separated systems in each of 
these entities.  As a result, data has to be transmitted to Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
either on compact or floppy disks with the associated risks.
The Smartgov system is therefore viewed as being inconsistent with the objectives set out above, 
and therefore not a successful IFMIS. However, work in Ethiopia suggests that such home-grown 
systems can be successful and may be a relatively economic approach to implementing an IFMIS 
(Peterson, 2007).
Capacity Building Implications
The insignificant capacity building implications of Rwanda's MTEF reforms discussed above also 
appear to apply to the country's IFMIS reforms.  This is particularly so in light of the evidence from 
the report of the Auditor General.  In addition, the high staff turnover, revealed in discussions with 
officials during the field visit, particularly affected the twelve local engineers involved in the 
development of Smartgov, and may have contributed to its limited success and functionality. 
Rwanda's efforts at introducing the MTEF appear to have been successful in consolidating and 
institutionalizing reforms begun earlier in 1999.  There appears to have been careful preparation for 
the introduction of these reforms. There is evidence of fairly adequate levels of training and 
sensitization of key personnel in Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and line ministries.  
However, the implementation of the reforms faced a number of challenges, the main one of which 
was the high turnover of staff in both Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and line ministries.  
As a result, although the annual budget follows the MTEF structure, there appear to be weaknesses 
in the overall planning process necessary for the entire three-year period covered by the MTEF.  
Having said that, there is evidence that Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning has maintained its 
leadership role in these reforms.  For example, it has provided line ministries with invaluable 
assistance in the form of a National Guide for Planning, Budgeting and Policy Review. The document 
contains guidance on key sections of the MTEF such as: a) strategic planning; b) the annual cycle of 
planning, budgeting and policy review; and c) budget execution.
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Budgetary execution appears to receive particular attention as evidenced by timely reports from the 
Auditor General.  In this regard, the report relating to the fiscal year ending 31 December 2005 but 
covering the period from November 2005 to October 2006, was presented to parliament in 
November 2006.   Discussions with officials in the Auditor General's office revealed that, although 
there were no consolidated national accounts prepared prior to those for the year 2006, the office 
relied on periodic budget execution reports for data relating to its reports.
A PEFA assessment (PEFA Secretariat, 2005) was undertaken of financial management in Rwanda 
during 2007.  This found that basic internal financial controls were poor.  Thus the effectiveness of 
internal controls over both payroll and for non-salary expenditure was rated D, the lowest possible 
score.  In addition, the Quality and timeliness of in-year budget reports and Scope, nature and follow-
up of external audit were similarly rated as D.  The PEFA report also noted that “the MTEF in 2006 (for 
the period 2007-09) appears to have collapsed into an annual budget preparation process.”  These 
findings, suggests that this reform has not been sustainable.
These findings further suggests that it may have been better for the Rwandan Government to 
concentrate on 'getting the basics right' rather trying to implement mega-reforms like the MTEF or 
IFMIS.   Given the high rates of persistent poverty in Rwanda despite the significant growth over the 
last decade or so it would appear that other tried and tested reforms (for example, budgetary 
control and external audit) would have benefited from increased investment and would have been 
significantly more cost effective and less risky.
Thus both the MTEF and the IFMIS reforms have only had limited success in Rwanda and basic 
internal financial controls are still rudimentary.  Despite the significant investment in terms of 
finance and local capacity, it is not clear that the Government has gained significantly from its major 
investment in the MTEF and IFMIS reforms, which were heavily influenced by the World Bank, IMF 
and the Department for International Development (UK). These organisations thus have significant 
responsibilities for these failures. They encouraged the Government of Rwanda to adopt reforms, 
which were not tried and tested (for example, at the time it was not clear that they had been 
successfully implemented in either France or the UK or many other countries in Africa). In addition, 
the environment in Rwanda and local capacity meant that the cost of the reforms would be higher 
and the risk of failure greater than in many other countries.
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V. WHAT CAUSED POOR QUALITY PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT?
“THE ECONOMY STUPID!”
The quality of governance and public financial management has gained renewed emphasis in recent 
years and since at least 1997 the World Bank and other aid agencies have played an influential role in 
this area in most Sub-Saharan African countries. The currently dominant view has developed that 
poor governance and public financial management is a major cause of poor economic growth in 
these countries. However, this section argues that the causal relationship runs the other way. 
Economic problems (originating from external events) led to the deterioration in the quality of 
governance and public financial management in many African countries. The international financial 
institutions and bilateral aid agencies were then able to use their new found power to introduce wide 
ranging public sector financial management reforms, for example the MTEF and IFMIS.
The origins of the Sub-Saharan debt burden
In the first few years after independence the economies of many Sub-Saharan African countries 
grew significantly and so their governments could afford to dramatically expand public services, 
especially for health and education. With the first major oil price rises in 1973-74 funds were readily 
available for these countries to borrow for significant public investment programmes. Situmbeko 
and Zulu (2004:16) report that:
Not surprisingly, then, many countries concentrated on Big Projects - showpiece 
government development projects that could be the motor for economic 
transformation, such as Ghana's Volta River Project, which involved construction of the 
Akosombo Dam in the early 1960s to form the world's largest artificial lake and building 
aluminium smelters to take advantage of the country's bauxite resources.
This approach was widely accepted at the time by the World Bank and others. The experience of the 
US and UK in the years following the second world war had shown that extensive government 
borrowing could facilitate economic growth. In the US the Federal debt alone (excluding state or 
local government debt) reached over 120% of GDP in 1946 (Office of Management and Budget, 2007) 
and in the UK Government debt peaked at nearly 250% of GDP (Clark and Dilnot, 2002) at around the 
same time. The sustained economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s meant that these levels of debt 
were sustainable, could be accommodated and were eventually repaid.  
However, most of the Global South was not to be so lucky.  In 1979-80 further oil price rises resulted 
in an increase in the price of their imports. Immediately following this, in the early 1980s, the United 
States raised interest rates to nearly 20% in a battle to throttle back its persistent inflation (Stiglitz, 
2006).  This led directly to a massive increase in the rate of world interest rates.  The real (inflation 
adjusted) interest rates paid by governments of the Global South increased from minus four per cent 
in 1975 to almost plus four per cent a decade later (Bond, 2006).  
A strategy for development, based on indebtedness…was suddenly transformed into an actual 
catastrophe by a decision emanating from a fraction of ruling classes within leading capitalist 
countries, with a total indifference for the hardship imposed on the third world (as well as for the rise 
of unemployment everywhere) (Duménil and Lévy, 2001).
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The rapid increase in world interest rates in the early 1980s on top of the oil price rises, led to a world 
recession.  As a result most countries of the Global South faced a reduced demand for their exports 
whilst having to pay much higher interest rates on their debts.  As Christian Aid (2003: 22) reported:
the prices Third World countries receive for many of their traditional exports, from 
coffee and cocoa to rice, sugar, and cotton, continue to decline. The relative value of 
their exports has declined even more—for example, in 1975 a new tractor cost the 
equivalent of 8 metric tons of African coffee, but by 1990 the same tractor cost 40 
metric tons.
The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO, 2005) estimated that if commodity 
prices had maintained the same real value as in 1980, the Global South would be earning an additional 
$112bn in annual export revenues, which was double the then level of their aid receipts. Putting it 
another way, between 1970 and 1997 changes in the terms of trade cost non-oil producing African 
states (excluding South Africa) a total of 119% of their annual GDP, according to the World Bank 
(2000).  External debt grew by 106% of GDP over the same period.  So all the external debt of Africa 
countries at the end of the twentieth century could be explained by falling prices for their exports 
and increasing prices of imports – both changes over which their governments had little or no 
control.
As UNCTAD (2004: 5) describes the result:
From just over $11 billion in 1970, Africa had accumulated over $120 billion of external 
debt in the midst of the external shocks of the early 1980s. Total external debt then 
worsened significantly during the period of structural adjustment in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, reaching a peak of about $340 billion in 1995.
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Figure 2: Global South: Real rate of interest, percent
Source: Duménil and Lévy (2001:16).
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The same UNCTAD report calculates that between 1970 and 2002 Sub-Saharan Africa received $294 
billion in loans, paid back $268 billion in debt service, but was left with debts of some $210 billion 
(UNCTAD, 2004: 9). As a result, by 1999:
the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) spent one-third of their tax revenues in 
servicing their debts. In some countries such as Angola (84%), Cote D'Ivoire (62%), 
Guyana (48%) and Sierra Leone (50%), this ratio was much higher (Jahan, 2003: 3).
Africa's fragile and marginalised economies went into deep crisis from the late 1970s.  Annual growth 
rates fell from a respectable 4 percent in 1970-79 to 1.7 per cent in 1980-1989 and only 0.4 per cent in 
1990-1994 (Capps, 2005). In 1989, even the World Bank was forced to admit that “overall Africans are 
as poor today as they were 30 years ago” (World Bank, 1989: 1) and per capita income in sub-Saharan 
Africa in 2000 was 10 per cent below the level reached in 1980 UNCTAD (2001).  
The introduction of new public management reforms
The high and unsustainable levels of debt in many Sub-Saharan African countries were thus due to 
external economic events beyond the control of their governments. However, whatever its origin, 
this debt forced these governments to approach the IMF and the World Bank for support. As a result, 
these financial institutions and other aid organisations started to exert considerable influence in 
many areas of policymaking including public sector financial management. 
The debt burden gave the World Bank and IMF the leverage it needed to implement its newly 
adopted policies of deregulation and privatisation through structural adjustment programmes 
(SAP). These almost invariably included the following elements:
• reduced government spending and greater fiscal discipline to control inflation
• removing import controls and restrictions on foreign investment
• privatisation of state enterprises
• devaluation of the currency
• making labour more flexible by reducing legal protection, food subsidies and minimum 
wages.
As Colin Leys notes, the dominant claims became that:
Governments were part of the problem, not part of the solution; they were inefficient 
and often corrupt and hence parasitic, not stimulators of growth. The solution was to 
privatize the public sector, reduce the scale and scope of government spending and give 
up all policies, from exchange rate controls to subsidies and redistributive taxation, 
that altered any prices that would otherwise be set by the impersonal forces of the 
market (Leys, 1996: 18).
Worsening pay and conditions for public sector workers
The generally poor economic conditions, the structural adjustment programmes and capital flight 
led to the downsizing of the public sectors and a significant worsening in the pay of public sector 
workers across Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s. As a result, there was a major loss of skills and 
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capacity and the quality of public financial management across much of the Global South inevitably 
deteriorated badly. As we said in our previous study of MTEF and IFMIS reforms in Sub-Saharan 
Africa:
Efficient, accountable, adequately paid and well-motivated civil servants are essential 
for an effective public sector, and especially to implement relatively complex reforms 
such as an MTEF or an IFMIS. Civil service reform was a major component of structural 
adjustment lending in the 1980s and the 1990s. Yet for the World Bank and IMF, such 
reforms primarily meant reducing the size of the civil service. At the same time, 
structural adjustment programmes led to a large decline in wages for civil servants who 
remained (Hawley, 2000). The IMF, for example, prompted wage reductions averaging 
14 per cent in 20 African countries in the 1990s (Lienert and Modi, 1997:18; Wynne, 2005: 
31-32).
Real wages in nearly every African country were estimated to have fallen between 50 and 60 per cent 
since the imposition of the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 1980s (ILO/JASPA, 1991). By 
1990, Margaret Joan Anstee, the UN Under-Secretary General could warn that:
The impact of recession and adjustment in the 1980s has been dealt with by economists 
and policy makers, within a framework of macro-analysis that pays scant attention to 
the people directly caught up in these economic events.  These trends were inexorably 
leading to an ominous deterioration of sub-Saharan Africa's scarce human capital, 
which can be replaced only at great cost.  They were setting the stage for an accelerated 
spiral of decline in the continent's future development (quoted in Brown, 1995: 266). 
Public sector workers were not immune from the effects of financial collapse and in many countries 
suffered from reduced pay and greater insecurity. This was the result of reduced government 
income, but also conditionality requirements from the World Bank and the IMF.  The result was that 
from the early 1980s to the early 1990s, the number of people employed by central government fell in 
Sub-Saharan Africa from 1.8% to 1.1% of the population and the average government wage also fell 
from 6.1 times per capita GDP to 4.8 times (Schiavo-Campo, de Tommaso and Mukherjee, 1997).  In 
Anglophone Africa, public sector wages declined by as much as 80% in real terms between the 
early1970s and the early 1980s (Ayee, 2005).  One of the authors of this report (Andy Wynne) has 
personal memories of this. Having taught in Southern Sudan in the late 1970s, he returned in 1984 
when teachers were clearly much poorer and the intermediate school teachers, with whom the 
school campus was shared, had only received salaries for six months of the previous year.
Uganda provides one of the most vivid examples with pay for civil servants in the late 1980s falling to 
only $10 a month (Kiragu and Mukandala, 2005).  A reform programme was launched in 1993 which 
halved the number of public servants through the reduction in ghost workers, a voluntary 
retrenchment scheme and a selective freeze on recruitment. Although this was coupled with 
significant salary increases in the early 1990s, the objective of a minimum living wage for civil 
servants is far from being realised according to Robinson who concludes that:
Failure to make progress on pay reform for the vast majority of public servants 
contributes to declining motivation. Large differentials between administrative grades 
and top civil servants, along with special treatment for senior officials in the political 
bureaucracy and semi-autonomous bodies like the URA, fuel resentment, undermine 
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morale and provide a stimulus to corruption. The lack of incentives for public servants 
who have to cope with continuous reform initiatives and future uncertainty further 
runs counter to a key objective of the reform programme as set out by the 1991 
presidential commission, namely the creation of a committed, responsible and results-
oriented civil service, which would be better paid, more efficient, and have more 
effective staff (Robinson, 2006).
Similarly in 2002, Byaruhanga noted that in Uganda:
Public sector pay has improved over the last decade though pay reform remains on the 
public sector institutional agenda. Pay for managerial, technical and professional civil 
service remains un-competitive, leading to difficulties in recruiting and retaining 
competent staff and also negatively impacting on public service delivery.
A more recent example of the effect of economic collapse of the salaries of public officials is Liberia 
where salaries of civil servants fell to a range of only $30 to $55 per month (Kumar & Brar, 2008).  
Many experienced and qualified staff left the public service and the country. This loss of human 
resources contributed to the major breakdown of government financial management systems.  
Similar effects are being reported with the economic collapse in Zimbabwe where doctors' salaries 
are reported to be only $10 a month (Shaw, 2009). 
The poor pay and conditions in the African public sector have been matched by the attraction of 
working in developed countries. Approximately 20,000 skilled workers leave Africa each year.  The 
World Bank's estimate of the share of Africa's skilled workers with a tertiary education who emigrate 
is more than 15 per cent, higher than any other region (Bond, 2006: 89). In many cases the loss of key 
public sector financial managers has led to the use of foreign consultants whose daily rate is often 
equivalent to the monthly salary of their local counterparts.  As noted in a previous report by Wynne:
The use of outside experts, funded by technical assistance loans, may also have 
hampered the growth of local expertise and capacity (Rama, 1997: 2) and demoralized 
the existing local professional staff, thereby adversely affecting their ability to 
successfully implement such complex reforms (Wynne, 2005: 32).
Link to increased corruption
The economic crisis across Sub-Saharan Africa made worse by the structural adjustment policies has 
meant that it became accurate to speak of the collapse of public administration in many African 
countries with the associated growth in corruption as argued by Hibou (1997: 91):
Since the mid-1980s, the rapid decline in the standard of living of civil servants, the 
virtual disappearance of operational budgets, frequent delays in the payment of 
salaries, the feeling of insecurity which now pervades elites and their consequent haste 
to enrich themselves, and the climate of total impunity have all conspired to cause a fall 
in the productivity of public officials. This was already low owing to the widespread 
practice of civil servants taking second jobs, the loss of their various allowances, the 
habit of charging for the performance of official duties, corruption, the erosion of 
accepted standards of public administration and the decline in the prestige of the state 
generally.
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The well-known economist Jeffrey Sachs (2005: 312) has also argued robustly that poverty in Africa 
does not result from corruption.  If anything, it is the reverse, African corruption is caused by its 
poverty:
Africa's governance is poor because Africa is poor… Africa shows absolutely no 
tendency to be more or less corrupt than other countries at the same income level. 
There is no evidence whatsoever that Africa is distinctly poorly governed by the stan-
dards of very poor countries.
But again the neoliberal policies of the World Bank and IMF may have made things worse.  Thus the 
former Chief Economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz (2002: 58) has claimed that:
Privatization has made matters so much worse that in many countries today 
privatization is jokingly referred to as “briberization”.
Similarly, Hibou notes that:
We may observe in Africa today that, contrary to the teachings of the neo-liberal rubric, 
measures of privatization and financial liberalization can lead to a plundering of the 
economy (Hibou, 1997: 71).
The link between Structural Adjustment Programmes, reduced pay and conditions of civil servants, 
low morale and corruption are also emphasised by Hawley (2000: 13):
structural adjustment programmes have led to a large decline in wages for civil 
servants who remain employed. IMF-prompted wage reductions…since 1990 [have 
been] an average of 14 per cent in 20 African countries… [these] have resulted in lack of 
motivation, low morale, and increased risks of petty corruption. 
Conclusions
The economies of most Sub-Saharan African countries went into deep decline from the early 1980s 
with the associated rise in government debt. This was largely due to external events; the increased 
price of oil, increased interest rates and declining prices for their exports.  African governments had 
little or no control over these events and so cannot be held responsible for the consequences.  
However, it did mean that public sector income was severely curtailed. As a result, and encouraged 
by the IMF, World Bank and aid agencies, governments were forced to reduce the number of their 
public servants and in many cases significantly reduce their salaries.  This clearly had a detrimental 
effect on the quality of public services including financial management and overall governance. 
Stiglitz interjects that:
Of course, if the developing countries had solved all of their own problems better, if 
they had more honest governments, less influential special interests, more efficient 
firms, better educated workers – if, in fact, they did not suffer from all the afflictions of 
being poor – they could have managed this unfair and dysfunctional globalisation 
better (Stiglitz, 2006: 58).
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However, these events have given the World Bank and aid agencies the power, through aid 
conditionality, to significantly influence the public sector financial management reform agenda 
across Sub-Saharan Africa.  This has often been through the use of, usually European, consultants 
paid significantly more than the financial managers they are retained to advice.
Thus, public sector financial managers across Sub-Saharan Africa, far from being the cause of the 
decline in the quality of public financial management, have in many cases struggled to try and 
maintain standards whilst suffering retrenchments, forced retirements and dramatic cuts in their 
living standards. These managers should be considered heroes and recognised as the experts they 
are on the history, capabilities and short-comings of the systems they manage. As a result, as the 
next section of this paper argues, public sector financial managers should have the over-riding 
responsibility for identifying the reforms which are to be adopted in their ministries, departments 
and agencies and take a clear lead in their implementation.
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VI. LOCAL EXPERTS SHOULD TAKE CONTROL TO REBUILD PUBLIC 
SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
The international financial institutions and aid agencies may adopt suitable strategic objectives, but 
these are not necessarily properly implemented.  They are only used as slogans and are not seriously 
used as a guide to action.  Thus the following ideas have been correctly promoted in recent years to 
guide public financial management reform, but have not been delivered in practice: a) county 
ownership; b) getting the basics; and c) sequencing of reform.
If we accept the arguments of the previous section, then public financial management has had a 
successful history, but became degraded in many African countries as a result of events beyond the 
control of their governments.  In these circumstances, what these countries need is a rebuilding and 
refinement of their public financial management systems rather than the root and branch reform 
suggested by such mega-reforms as the MTEF and IFMIS. This should be led by the countries 
concerned, and specifically, their financial managers who are the only experts on these systems.
Country ownership
Country ownership has been widely accepted and considered vital for the success of large scale 
public financial management reforms, especially since the OECD's Paris Declaration was adopted by 
over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior Officials in 2005. This agreement 
committed the donors to “respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to 
exercise it” (OECD, 2005). The report to the follow-up meeting in Accra, Ghana in October 2008 
reinforced this view noting that:
 
Country ownership and leadership are critical to success. Even when external pressures 
or internal crisis are the main triggers of PFM reforms, the starting point for real reform 
must be a country-owned response to such pressure in the form of a program of reform 
and a country-owned structure for managing the reform process (Working Party on 
Aid Effectiveness, 2008: 17).
The report further noted that:
The literature on PFM is replete with stories of failed reforms that were driven by 
donors rather than led by the country; such reforms may initially appear to be 
successful, but they are unlikely to be sustained and, in the worst cases, may be 
reversed after the withdrawal of donor support (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, 
2008: 18/19).
Despite these harsh warnings, the Declaration claims that it is the responsibility of the government 
of each country in the Global South, “to take leadership of its development processes” (Working Party 
on Aid Effectiveness, 2008: 4), rather than the international financial institutions and aid agencies, as 
the dominant partners, having the responsibility to ensure that the Global South is allowed to control 
its own destiny.   
In practice the international financial institutions and aid agencies (led by the IMF and the World 
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Bank) maintain close control over the public financial reforms in all Sub-Saharan African countries.  
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers were an initiative of the IMF and the World Bank in 1999 and, 
although developed by each country, they then have to be approved by the boards of both of these 
financial institutions (IMF, 2008).  They form the basis for aid and concessional loans from the IMF 
and World Bank themselves and the major donors whose support is often conditional on a country 
being 'on-track' with the international financial institutions.  In addition, the level of aid received by 
Sub-Saharan African countries is clearly uneven.  For example, according to the latest available 
figures, Zambia, with a per capita GDP of more than twice that of neighbouring Malawi, received 
almost twice as much aid per person (World Bank, 2008b).
Most public financial management projects which are funded by World Bank loans will have 
originated from a World Bank report.  In addition, many aid projects are also micro-managed by the 
aid agencies, for example, all contracts let under World Bank funded projects for public financial 
management reform have to be screened by World Bank officials to receive a 'no objection' 
clearance before the contract can be awarded. In addition, the contracts may be managed by 
independent agencies and periodically reviewed by World Bank officials.  As a former senior official 
of the IMF and World Bank said at an IMF seminar in October 2008, “There is little or no country 
ownership.  MTEF is often pushed onto reluctant countries by donor agencies.”
Despite this approach, the World Bank, for example, still has a tendency to blame the relevant 
country rather than the particular tools it has promoted. So in 1998 the World Bank said that, 
“advocates continue to suggest that the failure of these performance-orientated tools [an aspect of 
the MTEF] or techniques have been in implementation rather than in concept” (World Bank, 1998: 
16).  Over a decade later at a World Bank seminar Schick was still claiming that, “the widespread 
failure of MTEF has been due to the way it has been implemented, not because of a design flaw” 
(Schick, 2008).
Given the relative size and influence of the international financial institutions and donors compared 
to the public officials in the Global South:
the effects of donor imposition are sometimes difficult to distinguish from the effects 
of the adaption of ideas from elsewhere (Thirkildsen, 2006).
The World Bank now employs public financial management advisors in most Sub-Saharan African 
countries, directly provides or supports a range of training initiatives for public financial 
management officials across the continent and produces a range of publications relating to 
particular countries or of more general interest. Co-operative bodies for public financial 
management officials, for example, AFROSAI-E (for auditors general) CABRI (for budget officials) 
and ESAAG (for accountant generals) are dependent on the aid agencies for support and for the 
provision of international speakers for their events.  All these activities tend to increase the influence 
of the international financial institutions and the aid agencies.  In addition, these bodies are able to 
recruit leading public sector financial managers and officials, for example, the former Federal 
Minister of Finance of Nigeria worked for the World Bank before and after her term in office. The 
current President of Liberia worked for the World Bank, the head of public sector financial reform in 
Sierra Leone went on to work for the World Bank and the Auditor General of Uganda had a spell 
working for the PEFA Secretariat before returning to Uganda in 2007.
The standard approach to evaluating the quality of public financial management in the Global South 
is now the PEFA Framework.  These have been undertaken in over 70 countries with particularly high 
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PEFA indicator 2 suggests that in-year budgetary control (scoring D and C) is less well developed than 
the MTEF (PI-12 C and B). A strange result, indicating that although the annual budget for the 
government is not an accurate guide to the actual payments and receipts which will be made, the 
medium term planning framework was reasonably well developed.  In addition, internal controls for 
coverage in Sub-Saharan Africa (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness 2008). However, very few of 
these assessments were undertaken with the active involvement of the public sector officials of the 
country under review. Most are led by the World Bank and involve international consultants. The 
Auditor General of Uganda did undertake a PEFA type review in 2007, but this was criticised by the 
PEFA Secretariat as it was uncertain whether the donors would accept it as part of their fiduciary 
assessments.
Getting the basics right 
Public financial management reform should clearly be based on firm foundations, we have to 'get 
the basics right' to use Allen Schick's often repeated (and then ignored) phrase.  Specifically Schick 
has called for the need to “operate a reliable accounting system before installing an integrated 
financial management system” (World Bank, 1998) and “focusing on the credibility of the annual 
budget before introducing a medium-term perspective to budget planning” (Schick, 2008).
Despite these wise words, Sub-Saharan African governments have been encouraged to adopt the 
MTEF and IFMIS before basic internal financial controls have been brought up to an adequate 
standard.  As an IMF working paper noted:
MTEFs have sometimes been introduced prematurely, in the sense that annual budget 
outcomes and monitoring mechanisms were still quite primitive, resulting in outer-
year scenarios that were inconsistent with actual budget outcomes and/or the 
macroeconomic framework (Lienert and Feridoun, 2001).
Looking at the results of PEFA reviews for one country in East Africa and another in West Africa 
(undertaken in 2007) we can see that both countries implemented the MTEF and IFMIS before basic 
controls were adequately developed.  Both of these countries have a reasonably well-developed 
MTEF (PI- 12 scoring C and B respectively against the PEFA Framework) and they have also 
implemented reasonably successful IFMIS reforms.  However, other basic internal financial controls 
do not appear to be so well developed as the following table shows.
No Performance Indicator                     West Africa         East Africa
2 Composition of expenditure out-turn 
compared to original approved budget D C
12 Multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, 
expenditure policy and budgeting C B
18 Effectiveness of payroll controls D D
20 Effectiveness of internal controls for non-salary 
expenditure D C
22 Timeliness and regularity of accounts reconciliation C D
D1 Predictability of Direct Budget Support D D
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salary, non-salary payments and accounts reconciliation were found not to be effective (scoring four 
Ds and two Cs). Finally, the PEFA reviews of these two countries indicate that the medium term 
planning by their governments appeared to be better developed than the predictability of the direct 
budget support from the donor community which scored D for each country.
Similar findings are available from the recent PEFA assessment for South Africa (Quist et al., 2008).   
The MTEF is considered to be well developed, PI-12 scoring a B (although costed strategies are not 
produced for all departments). In contrast, the effectiveness of internal controls for non-salary 
expenditure and the quality and timeliness of in-year budget reports are not considered to be 
adequate and each of these aspects only scores a C+.  The predictability of the direct budget support 
from the donor community again scored D.
As Cuffie, Lam, Tung, Watanabe, and Wendle (2007: 25) note:
Since foreign direct budget support is a large component of Tanzania's budget, 
unpredictability of aid causes serious problems hindering budget predictability. The 
reported discrepancies are consistent with data gathered through our interviews...The 
unpredictability of aid flow from donors over a 3-year period limits the scope of MTEF 
on fiscal stability...Difficulty of planning with unpredictable donor budget is a real 
issue…Problem getting worse.
In addition, there is evidence that the MTEF and IFMIS are being viewed as the basic approaches to 
be implemented by all governments, national and local. Schiavo-Campo (2008: 7) warned against 
this approach, noting that:
The “reform” momentum is still at work, however. Especially troublesome is the notion 
of extending the MTEF to general government, requiring subnational entities to go 
through the exercise--as currently envisaged in some countries, e.g., Tanzania.
Our case study on Rwanda shows that the MTEF concept was being spread to the provinces and 
district councils during the decentralisation reforms from 2000. This is also the case in Nigeria where 
both the World Bank and the Department for International Development (UK) are supporting public 
sector reforms in a number of state governments.  The MTEF is seen as a key part of these reforms (at 
least by the donors) although PEFA indicators for basic internal financial controls are no better than 
with the examples from the two countries detailed above.
Somalia is well known for not having had a functioning national government for nearly two decades.  
Despite this, a World Bank mission to Somalia in late 2007 led to the recommendation to introduce an 
IFMIS.  This is despite Schick's recommendation to ensure that manual systems are working well 
before an IFMIS is introduced.  Similarly donor supported IFMISs have been implemented in several 
other post-conflict countries, including Liberia, Sierra Leone and Southern Sudan  (Kumar and Brar, 
2008).
Sequencing of reform
Sequencing of public sector financial reforms is clearly important and may be another way of 
ensuring that basic internal financial controls are refined before wide ranging mega-reforms such as 
the MTEF and IMFIS are implemented. But this approach may also be based on the assumption that 
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donors know what is needed and it is just a question of moving there in small easy steps. Thus the 
Department for International Development (UK) describes this type of approach as follows:
The platform approach aims to implement a package of measures or activities designed 
to achieve increasing levels ('platforms') of PFMA competence over a manageable 
timeframe.  Each platform establishes a clear basis for launching to the next, based on 
the premise that a certain level of PFMA competence is required to enable further 
progress to take place (DfID, 2005: 1).
This approach assumes that we know what we want to achieve, that the main attributes of sound 
public financial management are well understood and that all countries should achieve this common 
goal.  It is just a question of determining where on the development ladder a particular country finds 
itself to indicate what the next steps should be. However, reality is more complex. There are a variety 
of different approaches to public financial management and each country and organisation has, to a 
greater or lesser extent, developed its own approach. According to Larbi (2006):
The rush for reforms, especially when driven from outside, has often wreaked havoc in 
vital institutions that societies had created either to foster national unity, defend 
disadvantaged groups and regions or support national investments (Larbi, 2006: 3).
We have to start from a clear understanding of the particular priorities, demands, history and culture 
of each country, elements which local public financial managers are best able to understand.  They 
then have to consider carefully how existing systems may be re-built, improved and refined in the 
light of local experience, informed, as appropriate, by the lessons and experience of other countries. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
We conclude with a quote from Schiavo-Campo (2008: 26) that states that:
Costly failures have demonstrated that—as with any other institutional 
reform—successful introduction of a programmatic MTEF takes years of persistent 
efforts consistent with capacity, resources, awareness, incentives, and institutional 
realities. The two ingredients of the approach are therefore gradualism and selectivity, 
and the main conditions of success are simplicity and communication. If prematurely 
introduced or badly implemented, a formal and detailed programmatic MTEF causes 
enormous waste, frustration, and illusion—for trivial or non-existent benefits. The 
same is true of the informatics infrastructure for public financial management.
Africa needs to build on and enhance existing public financial management capacity, to nourish it and 
facilitate its development.  The local financial management officials are the international experts for 
the systems they are responsible for managing.  No consultant from outside the sector or country 
can know or understand the system as well as the public sector officials who have been managing 
the system for years, often through very difficult circumstances, with little personal reward.  The 
challenges to the quality of public financial management almost invariably originated from external 
events beyond the control of public financial managers or their governments.  All public financial 
management reforms should be led by the relevant officials and should be subject to informed local 
political support.
African countries have the basic systems or at least, every Sub-Saharan African country has had 
public financial management systems, which were at some stage relatively successful.  Public sector 
officials have the practical and intimate knowledge of how these systems actually worked. All 
proposed reforms of public financial management should be built on previously successful systems 
and not just aim to replace these with 'modern' systems.  We need to extend and repair the house 
not demolish it and start again.  An incremental approach, which utilises and enhances local capacity, 
is far more likely to be successful than a big bang approach to the implementation of mega-reforms 
such as the MTEF and IFMIS.
Complex systems and reforms are always more risky than simple approaches.  We need to ensure 
that the proposed public financial management reforms are kept as simple as possible: 
KISS – keep it simple stupid!
'International best practice' has to be adapted to make it fit local conditions – international best 
practice is never the complete answer.  Thus, for example, the relatively successful MTEF in Uganda 
has now adopted a five-year planning horizon rather than the standard three years.  Similarly the 
Botswana Government, which is relatively immune from external pressures from the international 
financial institutions, has adopted a six–year plan with a review at the half-way point.
African countries also have to make sure that actual international best practice is being adopted and 
that it really has been tried and tested and been proved to be successful.  Sub-Saharan African public 
sector officials have to be sure that there is appropriate evidence that the proposed reforms have 
actually been proved to work in similar environments before being accepted for implementation in 
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their jurisdictions. Multi-year budget frameworks and programme budgeting may be good ideas, but 
they have been difficult to implement in practice. The UK tried for 30 years until 1997 to implement a 
three-year budget framework and it is not clear that the current arrangements will survive the recent 
international financial turmoil. France only implemented its current approach to programme 
budgeting from 2006 and is only implementing a three-year budget framework with effect from 
2008.  The US Government does not have an MTEF.
There are many other examples of reforms which were heavily promoted by the aid agencies and 
international consultants which time has shown were either mistaken or carried significant 
additional associated costs. As the American academic, Wildavsky notes, “the corridors of power are 
littered with the bodies of failed reforms”. Fees for children to attend primary school, for example, 
were introduced as part of the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s 
in line with the general practice of levying user charges for public services.  In the course of the 1990s 
a new consensus emerged (on the basis of the actual decline in primary school enrolment after the 
introduction of fees).  Governments were now encouraged to abolish primary school fees as soon as 
practically feasible in financial terms. Several Sub-Saharan African countries did abolish primary fees 
and this was supported by the World Bank and the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC). In 
four east African countries, for example, the following dramatic increase in primary school 
enrolment occurred during the first year after the abolition of tuition fees:
1994 Malawi 51%
1996 Uganda 67%
2001 Tanzania 49%
2002 Kenya 22% (Burnett and Kattan, 2004; Sperling, 2005)
It would appear that the World Bank and the IMF are now slowly revising their support for mega-
reforms, such as the MTEF and IFMIS.  There has been a slight movement away from support for 
larger reforms, such as MTEF and IFMIS, towards smaller scale pragmatic reforms linked directly to 
individual country problems and challenges.  In 2008, both organisations held significant seminars 
reviewing the evidence for the success (or more common failure) of such reforms; the World Bank in 
March and the IMF in October 2008.
There has been the beginning of a trend to take the 'I' (for integrated) out of proposed IFMIS 
projects so that smaller, more modest, and so less risky, computer projects now tend to be 
supported.  In addition, there has been some unbundling of MTEFs so that individual aspects may be 
supported rather than the whole mega-reform being recommended for immediate implementation 
(Dorotinsky, 2008). Thus in Benin, an action plan for reform of public financial management, 
developed in late 2008 for the donor community, does not call for an MTEF or an IFMIS. Rather it 
includes measures to improve the medium term projections of the macro-economic aggregates and 
standards to ensure the compatibility of computer systems within the Ministry of Finance (Dendura, 
Chatelain and Schwap, 2008).
However, there is still a long way to go. We still need to gain widespread recognition that the 
governance and financial management problems suffered by many Sub-Saharan African countries 
arose from global events over which they and their governments had little or no control. The 
international financial institutions and the donor agencies need to ensure that they use their 
financial power judiciously to enable host governments and their public financial managers to take 
real leadership of their reform agenda.
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The change agenda arising from the world recession and the election of Barack Obama as US 
president should help with this process.  We need to move away from mega-reforms such as MTEF 
and IFMIS.  Public financial managers need to be provided with the political support and necessary 
resources to implement basic tried and tested reforms.  Sub-Saharan African countries cannot afford 
the risks involved of adopting further large scale reforms, especially those that have not been tried 
and proved to be successful in similar environments. The governments of Sub-Saharan Africa and 
their public financial managers need to take full strategic and operational control of their public 
financial reform agenda if the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals is not to become 
even less likely.
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(3) Mr.T.E.Gatabazi, Accountant General.
(4) Mr. G.Byamukama, Director, Local Government Finance Unit.
(5) Mr A.Biraro, Deputy Auditor General.
(6) Mr D.Biseruka, Director in charge of Payroll Reforms, Ministry of Public Service.
(7) Mr. J.Rurangirwa, Director, ICT Unit, MINECOFIN.
(8) Mr P. Mashingaidze, Consultant: Public Sector Financial Reforms in Rwanda.
44
PREVIOUS ISSUES OF ACBF OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES
OCCASIONAL PAPER 1 (2002)
AFRICA: MAJOR DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES & THEIR CAPACITY BUILDING DIMENSIONS 
Soumana Sako
OCCASIONAL PAPER 2 (2003)
THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT: BUILDING ECONOMIC & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
INSTITUTIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Soumana Sako
OCCASIONAL PAPER 3 (2004)
CAPACITY BUILDING IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES IN AFRICA : A SUMMARY OF LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 
FROM MOZAMBIQUE, RWANDA, SIERRA LEONE & UGANDA 
Severine Rugumamu
OCCASIONAL PAPER 4  (2005)
MEASURING PERFORMANCE OF INTERVENTIONS IN CAPACITY BUILDING: SOME FUNDAMENTALS 
Genevesi Ogiogio
OCCASIONAL PAPER 5  (2006)
CHALLENGES FACING AFRICA’S REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES IN CAPACITY BUILDING
Soumana Sako
OCCASIONAL PAPER 6 (2007)
CAPACITY BUILDING FOR THE PROMOTION OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN AFRICA - CHALLENGES AND 
STRATEGIES
Soumana Sako & George Kararach
OCCASIONAL PAPER 7 (2007)
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: HOW SENSIBLY MUST AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND TRADE 
NEGOTIATORS STAND?
Tadeous T. Chifamba 
OCCASIONAL PAPER 8 (2008)
PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REFORMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE FROM 
GHANA, TANZANIA AND UGANDA.
Andy Wynne
The African Capacity Building Foundation
7th Floor, ZB Life Towers
Cnr. Jason Moyo Avenue/Sam Nujoma Street
P.O. Box 1562
Harare, ZIMBABWE
Tel: (+263 4) 702931/2, 790398/9, 700208, 700210/11
Fax: (+263 4) 702915, 700215, 792894
Email: root@acbf-pact.org
Web site: www.acbf-pact.org
ISBN 978-1-77937-018-1
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons  
Attribution – NonCommercial - NoDerivs  3.0 Licence. 
 
 
 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
 
